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Michael Eisenscher’s (1999) basic point, that unions need to mobilize
the rank-and-file members rather than rely primarily on staff, is valid and
important. There is a real danger that unions will atrophy if members view
unions as businesses from which they buy certain representation services,
rather than as part of a social movement in which the members personally
participate. Still, I have a number of quibbles:
First, the need for mass mobilization is something that good organizers
have known for a long time. For example, Karsh (1958) documents an
organizing drive in the early 1950s that relied on extensive personal contacts
with the employees of a garment factory and rallied support from other
unionized workers in the community and church leaders. A more recent
example of mass mobilization was the organizing drive among Harvard
University clerical and technical workers that began in the 1970s and
brought union representation in the 1980s (Palmer et al., 1990; Hoerr, 1997).
Second, although excessive reliance on staff and degeneration of
unions into bureaucratic or autocratic institutions have undoubtedly weak-
ened the labor movement, other factors have also contributed significantly to
the erosion of union strength:
. Changes in labor law make a difference. Ellwood and Fine (1987) found
that right-to-work laws substantially hindered union organizing. Saltzman
(1988) demonstrated that, even in the absence of changes in the climate of
public opinion toward unions, the enactment of public-sector bargaining
laws led to union growth.
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* Interpretation and enforcement of labor law also affect unions’ ability to
organize. The Reagan appointees to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), for example, overturned dozens of NLRB doctrines that favored
unions. Despite the general aversion of Reagan’s appointees to a large role
for government, they expanded &dquo;the scope of labor law, but only when to
do so would contain union and not management power&dquo; (Weiler, 1990).
In contrast, the Clinton-appointed NLRB chairman, William Gould, and
NLRB General Counsel, Fred Feinstein, applied for temporary injunctions
under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act to force the
prompt rehiring of workers who may have been fired illegally for union
organizing activity. Decades earlier, Les Aspin (1966), who subsequently
served in Congress for many years, had shown that prompt reinstatement
of employees fired for organizing activity led to substantially higher sup-
port for unions in representation elections. The Republicans in the House
of Representatives apparently agreed with Democrat Aspin on the impor-
tance of this matter, for they responded to the Gould-Feinstein policy by
voting in 1995 to cut the NLRB budget by 30% and adopting a rider that
limited the NLRB’s ability to seek 10(j) injunctions (Congressional Quar-
terly Weekly Report, 1995). They also prohibited the NLRB from spend-
ing federal funds to implement a proposed rule allowing unions to orga-
nize a single site of a multi-site employer (which is often easier than
organizing all the sites at once) and continued that prohibition from 1995
through at least 1998 (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1998).
. Intensified employer efforts to avoid unionization have thwarted organiz-
ing. Foulkes (1980) described the sort of enlightened personnel policies,
such as avoiding layoffs, that some employers adopted to dry up the griev-
ances that can lead to unionization. Weiler (1983), in contrast, stressed
employer coercion as a reason for declining unionization. Similarly, Free-
man and Medoff (1984) reported a very large increase, beginning in the
1960s, in illegal anti-union activities by employers. By 1980, they noted,
&dquo;one in twenty workers who favored the union [in a representation cam-
paign] got fired.&dquo; More recently, Saltzman (1995) detailed the increased
use of expensive personnel selection procedures to weed out union sup-
porters during the hiring process for recently built auto plants.
There are also other factors, such as changes in industrial structure and the
migration of industry to the South that have eroded union strength. Thus, the
factor that Eisenscher identified is only one of several and may not be the
most important.
Third, Eisenscher’s preference for participatory democracy rather than
representative democracy ignores that national or global nature of many
product markets. The kind of decentralization needed for participatory de-
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mocracy is practical for the Painters union or the International Association
of Fire Fighters because the employers with whom they negotiate typically
only compete on a local basis. It is less practical, however, for the Steel-
workers because they need an industry-wide contract or pattern contract in
order to take wages out of competition. Participatory democracy only works
well when the group involved is small, and national or global product mar-
kets mean that union contracts or essentially similar contract provisions must
cover a large number of employees in order to be effective.
Fourth, Eisenscher is right to point out that it is preferable for unions
to avoid relying heavily on hired staff who have never worked in the occu-
pation they represent. Certainly, unions representing skilled workers, such as
the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teach-
ers, can easily find rank-and-file members who can bargain contract lan-
guage effectively. Nevertheless, unions representing unskilled workers, such
as the aides in a nursing home, often cannot easily find rank-and-file mem-
bers who could fill this role well without the assistance of a hired staff
member.
Finally, Eisenscher seems to indicate that the reluctance of American
unions to adopt socialist ideology has weakened the labor movement. Cer-
tainly, socialist ideology has motivated some individuals to become active
members of the labor movement or union staffers. Nevertheless, as Howe
(1985) and others have noted, the barriers to socialism in America are both
considerable and persistent. As a result, there is less popular support for
socialism in America than in Canada or Europe. I doubt that the adoption of
an unpopular political doctrine would increase the ability of American
unions to recruit large numbers of new members.
Furthermore, efforts by unions to change conservative political views
of some union members are not always successful. For example, the politi-
cally liberal United Auto Workers (UAW) was unable to keep large numbers
of white UAW members from voting for George Wallace in 1968 and 1972
and for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 (Greenberg, 1996). My guess is
that the UAW would have even less success persuading members to support
avowed socialists than it did persuading them to support self-described lib-
erals such as Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale.
In summary, I agree in part with Eisenscher, but I doubt that he has
discovered a universal formula to revitalize the American labor movement.
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